This article discusses the continuous substitution of traditional mutual conflicts and historical grievances between Slovakia and Hungary that has created fertile ground for nationalists on both sides. Currently, we witness the rise of anti-Roma positions and negativism oriented toward this particular group of the population in Slovakia and Hungary. 
INTRODUCTION
In dealing with minority relations analysis the scope of the research is vested in developments in the region of Central Europe. Throughout the twentieth century the region was a testing ground for a variety of socio-political regimes that can hardly be characterized as democratic. With the exception of the creation of new nation-states as an output of the dissolution of the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy after the end of the World War I, the periods during the following decades are considered negative and even tragic with regard to the status of the civil societymutatis mutandis for minority group members.
Only the last decade of the previous century enabled the countries of Central Europe to return to a Western type of democracy. The final collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent revival of society and the political establishment showed a wave of further development. One of the many critical developments in the postSoviet era was the renewal and boost of the European integration process.
Together with policy-making, there was also the need to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of national minorities living in the territories of the respective sovereign states. The national policy making toward the minorities was essential in the democracy-building procedures in the countries of CEE. 1 The consolidation of democracy was often, as scholars have observed, related to the treatment of national minorities. 2 Apparently, the spectrum of the countries in this region adopted different approach and methods in promoting the citizenship or status for minority members.
These differences are basically seen in the various regions of post-Soviet Europe.
While in the Visegrad group countries the major disputes are still very related to the consequences of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, the Baltic States region can be classified as a historical grievance and rejection of Russification and Sovietization of the Baltic societies. In the case of former Yugoslavia there were civic and secular dimensions of the ethnic conflicts in the common federation.
From the perspective and focus on the region of Central Europe, we should admit another well-known minority conflict-the situation, position, and integration of Roma minority. This observance, together with the management of SlovakHungarian nationalism, will be central to this article. The major discourse in mutual Slovak-Hungarian relations is closely associated with ethnic nationalism, language issues, and historical grievances. Specifically, these relations escalated into various heterogeneous countries, even though it is practically impossible to talk about any one European country as a homogeneous one, considering the ethnic structure of the state.
There has been widespread research on the largest minority group in Europe -the Roma. The majority of this research deal with the social integration
phenomena. An example of such analysis in twelve countries of Europe might be the thematic issue of Social Sciences Eastern Europe published by GESIS, 4 publication "Roma: A European Minority …" 5 or the very recent survey report published in 2012 by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. 6 Another vital source of complex studies of the Roma population in Europe is the influential contribution of Aidan McGarry, who follows the nexus and structure of cross national political participation and representation of Roma. 7 Due to the complexity of the research problem, this article consists of multiple sections. First, the article focuses on the traditional conflict line that had created the bias for rise of nationalism between Slovaks and Hungarians since the 90's. We identify the developments and obstacles in minority policy-making in the selected two countries, since this is considered a crucial point in treatment of national minorities in sovereign states. Second, the article examines the roots and sources of new wave nationalism, which may be described as anti-Roma positions and negativism. In the third part of the paper we use sample quotations from the individual in-depth interviews with young respondents from two research locations in Slovakia to interpret our arguments. The data collection and analysis was performed within international collaborative project MYPLACE (Memory, Youth, Political Legacy and Civic Engagement). The fieldwork was conducted during late 2012.
The paper has no aim to solve the issue of nationalism in Central Europe.
However, derived from the analysis and current situation in both states, the focus is on explaining the reasons of the changing status quo. A critical part of this change is the denial of nationalism related to interstate conflict, and gaining support of the common citizenry for the parties and movements who emphasize ethnic nationalism against one specific group of inhabitants.
Therefore, the article argues that support for traditional national parties and movements continues to diminish and the new wave of right-wing extremism continues to spread across the region, which can be demonstrated through the popular support of political leaders who gain their political power through antiRoma campaigning.
MINORITY POLICY-MAKING IN HUNGARY AND SLOVAKIA
In this part of the paper, we discuss the national perspective of minority policymaking in the two states that have shared a common history for several centuries during the existence of the Hungarian Kingdom and later the Austrian-Hungarian
Monarchy.
In this retrospective approach, Hungary is considered a country that codified the collective rights of minorities even earlier than the other countries of the region.
Formulation of the requirements for the minority groups living in Hungary was acknowledged already in the second half of the 80s. This period was characteristic due to the economic and political transformation caused by the society changes in the whole Central Eastern Europe. Hungary witnessed systematic changes still in the 70s in relation to the status and position of the ethnic groups. 8 The article discusses the mistreatment of Hungarian minorities which began in the second half of the 70s. 1) have lived in the territory of Hungary at least for one century;
2) members of the ethnic group possess the Hungarian citizenship;
3) the difference from other citizens is distinguished by language, culture, identity and active form of solidarity which leads to preserve those differences. 9 In the very same Constitutional paragraph the political representation of national minorities was guaranteed by the constitutional act. Upon this decision the minorities shall obtain the rights to create local and national self-governments. The new Constitution created new institutions as well, the Office for Ethnic and National
Minorities and an Ombudsman for minority rights, whose competences shall be vested in helping to solve the issues and relations among citizens if there is case of violation of law. Hungary had become one of the few European countries that created specialized institutions to protect its national minorities. The first Ombudsman was designated in 1995 and acted as an institution independent of executive or judiciary power. However, it has the duty to inform the Hungarian Parliament about its acts.
The formerly established Office for Ethnic and National Minorities, which was essentially built as an independent body, was transformed into the Ministry for National and Ethnic minorities within the Prime Minister's Office of Hungary in 2007.
All the changes applied in the legal norms declared the Hungarian position in adopting the historical continuity of cultural differentiation that practically stressed the settlements of culturally different ethnic groups in today Hungary. The aim of this policy was to offer and guarantee the specific rights of the groups of citizen that were identified on the basis of different cultural characteristics.
We can then declare that the focus on differentiating the citizens' ethnicity was completely different, as in the case of Soviet principle of minority assimilation.
Already in 1989 the request of assimilation was substituted by the opposite perspective -instead of neglecting the use of the minority languages toward protection and active use of the minority tongue. The applied changes have settled 9 Ibid: 174-175.
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Although the minority acts in Hungary introduced the right for minorities to create political representation in the local and national self-governments, there are significant absences in national level representation in the Parliament. The adopted law practically did not comment this kind of representation, since the acquired legal system acknowledged the permanent minority representation, which could not be achieved due to the minority representation already at the local level. This factor remained unsolved and problematic during the system transformation in the 90s
and following the up-to-date structure of the Hungarian parliament we cannot talk about the adequate nondiscrimination strategies from the perspective of proportional representation. The law from 1993 defined the existence of 13 minorities in Hungary (Table 1) . 13 This can be demonstrated as an imperfect condition for registration of candidates and authentication method of ethnicity. Therefore, the current legislation is going to be updated in this sense for practical reasons.
In considering the application of the European dimension of a policy of non- In the case of the independent Slovak Republic, we can talk about the greatest percentage of minority population out of all V4 countries. According to the numbers expressed in percentages based on the censuses in Slovakia since 1991, we confirm the existence of multiple minority populations, particularly the Hungarian and Roma (Table 2 ). At present, the Hungarian minority represents about 8.5% of the Slovak population which, in absolute numbers corresponds to 458,467 inhabitants of Hungarian nationality. On closer examination of the Slovak ethnic composition of the population, we find that the Roma minority, unlike most numerous ethnic Hungarians, recorded an upward trend, and therefore currently constitutes about 2% of the total population. Slovakia is a country that is made up of traditional ethnic groups; this means that their presence is due to the ethnic composition of the state formations, which included the territory of present-day Slovakia in the past and minorities on its territory organized for decades and centuries. These include also the Czech, Rusyn, Ukrainian, German, Polish, Croatian, Serbian, Russian, Bulgarian and Jewish minorities. important standards were adopted, namely the use of names and surnames in the minority language 21 and bilingual labeling of the municipalities where the minority population exceeds 20% of the population. 21 The Law on Registry Office in Slovakia, Collection of Laws (1994, no. 154). 22 The Law on Labelling in Minority Languages in Slovakia, Collection of Laws (1994, no. 191) . See also Jaroslav Mihálik and Juraj Marušiak, "The dynamics of Slovak-Hungarian relations -the shift from ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 7, NUMBER 2 2014
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In 1995 another amendment to the original law on the use of language in 1990 was adopted and a much stricter definition given that the Slovak language takes precedence over other languages and this is an obligation for the state to create the educational, scientific and information systems in such conditions that each citizen shall acquire and use the state language as spoken and written. 23 The reaction of a radically oriented wing of Hungarian opposition parties led by Miklós
Duray likened the law to cultural fascism: "murderous attacks against the Magyar language and culture in Slovakia is cultural fascism, organized destruction of what took place in Nazi death camps". And further: "Our ultimate goal is political and economic autonomy and total territorial autonomy". He also warned the Hungarian minority not to marry Slovak women, because it will "taint Hungarian race". Representatives of Roma communities usually disagree with such labeling, since it involves discriminatory tendencies against the ethnic group. Likewise, the titular citizens refer to such ethnic discourse as social exclusion compared to issues of minority integration.
Slovak society is differentiated with regard to ethnic and cultural composition; therefore we assume that these inequalities and diversity provide for cultural and ethnic heterogeneity. 28 The assumption is that the major source of ethno- The SNS played a similar anti-Roma card two years ago. In 2010 they used a billboard depicting a half-dressed, obese Roma man with the slogan: "Stop feeding those who do not want to work!" The party was charged with running a discriminatory and racist campaign, so the party had to cover the billboards ( Figure   3 ). In addition to its anti-Roma campaign, the nationalist SNS is also using slogans blasting neighbouring Hungary, a country that is itself led by nationalist conservatives. "We've been defending Slovak land for 140 years. Orbán's boat is sinking", is the SNS message, which picks out Hungary's economic problems under the leadership of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. 35 SNS leader, Ján Slota, is also known for anti-Hungarian rhetoric; he is also claiming that Budapest has not yet abandoned the idea of establishing and reviving the "Great Hungary". In other In general, Jobbik is considered the most radical Hungarian political party.
With its 47 seats in parliament, the party claims to be a eurosceptic, nationally oriented party that emphasizes the national sovereignty and the citizens' 
RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM AS A NEW FORM OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL NATIONALISM 39
Academic studies show that it is very difficult to study the 'radical right' or extremism in transforming countries, especially in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), because there is a lack of reliable information on racist extremism in the region. However, there is some evidence that racist extremism in the CEE region (including Slovakia) follows a pattern, organizationally, of small scale mobilization and, substantively, is linked to issues of transition such as corruption, a worsening economic situation, and minority protection or European enlargement. 40 Extremist tensions in society are also encouraged by an educational system that keeps a strong national and ethnic bias, and reproduces stereotypes in society, especially those regarding minorities. Some respondents in our research viewed extremist groups as motivated solely by political power; they aimed to attract voters through radical populism.
Cziko exemplifies this view: "people get cheated, it is the same as high level politics" (Cziko, Rimavská Sobota). Respondents recognize that people are frustrated by the failure of politicians to solve inequalities, but see extremist solutions as fanatic or sick. Respondents discussed skinhead groups as extremist and racist and stated that they did not approve of them, although often in passing noting that they agreed with some of their ideas: "I agree with them, but I think it 43 Ibid.
ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 7, NUMBER 2 2014
201
is not correct" (Leila, Rimavská Sobota). Respondents also consider Peoples' PartyOur Slovakia and its leader, Marian Kotleba, to be extremist.
In fact, young people, especially from the south-eastern region of Slovakia, display some sympathy with such extremist parties: they acknowledge that they offer some kind of solution, but say they do not vote for them because these solutions are not correct or real solutions. 'Others' they know-one reference is to friends from the gym-do vote for extremists, however, and agree with such radical measures.
The research conducted suggests that racism is still a widespread phenomenon in Slovakia. One Roma respondent is disgusted that people judge all Roma as the same: "We are not all the same. There are educated and decent people who want to work. But there is no work, so what can they do?" (Beata, Rimavská Sobota).
At the same time, reflecting on the source of this negative stance towards Roma, the respondent characterizes her community in the same way: "because most of us steal, are dirty and rude and this is true" (Beata, Rimavská Sobota).
Racial prejudice has become normalized in Slovakian society as is evident from Kristinka's comment below: "... in Slovakia it is normal that people have issues with the Roma. Young people are easy to influence and if they gather around those who are older and who share negative attitudes about Roma they automatically consider it to be true and valid" (Kristinka, Rimavská Sobota).
Offensive comments about the Roma are often repeated within families and respondents point out the way in which the media create an image of all Roma as the same and broadcast only negative news about Roma communities. Thus, respondents consider racism one of the major conflicts in society; it is a long term problem which they struggle to imagine how to address. "All the people are against gypsies. Although, we might be proud of some individuals or Roma that did something positive or try to do something. But I think we are a racist state. I know very few people that would treat Roma positively" (Jana, Trnava).
Opinions vary also on what to do about extremist groups. Libor calls for them to be banned, saying, "I don't understand how an intelligent person can vote for something like Kotleba or Jobbik in Hungary" (Libor, Trnava). Others express real hatred towards extremists: "I completely reject and hate people who judge on racial prejudice, it totally makes me sick" (Nikoletta, Trnava). However, some respondents argue that it would be undemocratic to prohibit extremist organizations or even admit, "I passively support them" (Ivan, Trnava). The most extreme references include that some of Hitler's plans were good.
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It is also evident that respondents aged 13-18 years are more tolerant of AfricanAmericans and Asians than of the Roma.
The interviews in both research locations confirmed the general sources of the rise of the extremism in contemporary Slovak society to be: poverty and lack of social inclusion; tension escalated by incorrect and unverified information from some media; the role of family and community in shaping the views of youth.
In general? The desperate situation regarding the Roma issue. People follow the news and they see that gypsies beat up a white guy out of nowhere or that they were given new houses for free. Similarly, when one sees that a white man gets gypsy neighbours and they start destroying everything and he can't stop it? The municipality doesn't help him, nor the state. So if you see something like that, it eats away and, in the end, it might lead to a conflict, a murder or massacre, as privileged somehow over the majority of society and benefit from "too much affirmative action for them" (Jakub, Rimavská Sobota). One respondent claims, "they get houses, destroy them, and then ask for new ones, they get them, move there and again destroy them" (Duro, Rimavská Sobota). Even though the Roma are considered a minority or marginalized community, according to the interviewees they enjoy much better opportunities than others who are working: "Roma have cheaper living costs, they get more state support for doing nothing, they only do bad things and ruin everything" (Kristinka, Rimavská Sobota).
Negative statements considerably outweigh positive sentiments towards Roma. Only several references were recorded in which Roma were viewed positively. These included references to having Roma neighbours or acquaintances:
"We have gypsy neighbours who behave well" (Jenny, Trnava); "I know decent
Roma" (Lucia, Trnava). They also blamed the media for negative stereotyping:
"People have issues against Roma because of media power" (Vojtech, Rimavská Sobota). However, such statements constitute exceptions to the rule.
A number of statements refer to personal beliefs or experiences with Roma.
These range from banal xenophobic statements such as "I don't like Roma" (Miriam, Rimavská Sobota) or "they can't speak Slovak" (Jakub, Rimavská Sobota)
to claims that relations between Slovak and Roma communities constitute "a reciprocal racism" (Barbora, Rimavská Sobota). Respondents also felt their right to redress was limited, complaining that "there are no legal ways to penalise Roma" (Jenny, Trnava) and that declaring their own feelings honestly might lead to being labeled a racist, which would cause them problems either in school, social networks or in public affairs.
CONCLUSION 45
The continual strength and support for the Hungarian extremists might be explained similarly to the case in Slovakia. The traditional conservative political actors resist promptly reacting to the critical junctures that their societies are currently dealing with. Newly formed parties promise radical changes and prompt reactions in managing the society's needs and inequality. This can be considered a possible cure for the neglected problems that have been consistently falling behind state policy for the past twenty years. The failure of the states' strategies in integrating the Roma population in both countries gave the legitimacy to extremist formations that operate on the boundaries of their democratic and authoritarian system(s). 45 Some of the material in this section is also presented in the research report of the MYPLACE project: Jaroslav Mihálik and Peter Horváth, supra note 39. problems. However, there were also some positive statements that Roma were sometimes better than 'us' and that issues with Roma could be resolved. However, respondents were unable to express how these issues might be addressed, and, in general, support for radicalism and extremism among young people has risen over recent years. Although support for radical solutions tends to remain at the level of words, action may be constrained primarily because young people do not want to be labelled extremists or racists because of the stigma attached to these terms. A combination of the persistence of social inequalities, state incapacity to improve the economic situation of families, and a rise in civic disengagement has increased support for the radical populists, especially among those young people who seek political alternatives.
